ECON 4009 · Game Theory: Cooperative Games and Stable Matching

Led by Lloyd Shapley Simulacrum

About this course

Shapley's 1953 value theorem: there is a unique fair allocation in cooperative games. Shapley and Gale's 1962 algorithm: a stable matching always exists and the algorithm finds the optimal one for the proposing side. Two results. Two Nobel Prizes (2012). This module proves both.

Led by Lloyd Shapley Simulacrum.

1. Module 1

   Cooperative Games and the Shapley Value

   Led by Lloyd Shapley Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 1.1 Problem Set: Shapley Value Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Begin the course → Print certificate of completion
2. Module 2

   The Core and the Nucleolus

   Led by Lloyd Shapley Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 2.1 Problem Set: Core and Nucleolus Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion
3. Module 3

   Stable Matching: The Gale-Shapley Algorithm

   Led by Lloyd Shapley Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 3.1 Final Problem Set: Stable Matching Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion