ECON 4010 · Game Theory: Mechanism Design and Optimal Auctions

Led by Myersonian Mechanism Design Simulacrum

About this course

The revelation principle: any implementable outcome can be achieved by a truthful direct mechanism. The optimal auction: allocate to the highest virtual valuation. Myerson-Satterthwaite: no mechanism achieves efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance simultaneously when type distributions overlap. This module proves all three.

Led by Myersonian Mechanism Design Simulacrum.

1. Module 1

   Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Principle

   Led by Myersonian Mechanism Design Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 1.1 Problem Set: Revelation Principle Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Begin the course → Print certificate of completion
2. Module 2

   Optimal Auction Design

   Led by Myersonian Mechanism Design Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 2.1 Problem Set: Optimal Auction Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion
3. Module 3

   The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem

   Led by Myersonian Mechanism Design Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 3.1 Final Problem Set: Mechanism Design Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion