ECON 4006 · Game Theory: Potential Games and Equilibrium Selection

Led by Andrey Kolmogorov Simulacrum

About this course

Monderer and Shapley (1996): a game has a potential when there exists a single function capturing every player's incentive to deviate. Young (1993): with rare mutations, learning dynamics converge to equilibria that maximise the potential. The connection is exact. This module proves it.

Led by Andrey Kolmogorov Simulacrum.

1. Module 1

   Potential Functions and Potential Games

   Led by Andrey Kolmogorov Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 1.1 Problem Set: Potential Functions Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Begin the course → Print certificate of completion
2. Module 2

   Stochastic Stability and Markov Chains

   Led by Andrey Kolmogorov Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 2.1 Problem Set: Stochastic Stability Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion
3. Module 3

   Stochastic Stability in Potential Games

   Led by Andrey Kolmogorov Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 3.1 Final Problem Set: Potential and Stochastic Stability Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion