ECON 4008 · Game Theory: Repeated Games, Folk Theorems, and Common Knowledge

Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

Correlated equilibrium, the agreeing-to-disagree theorem, common knowledge via partition models, and the folk theorem for infinitely repeated games — taught by the economist who formalised all three.

1. Module 1

   Correlated Equilibrium

   Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 1.1 Problem Set: Correlated Equilibrium Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Begin the course → Print certificate of completion
2. Module 2

   Common Knowledge and Agreeing to Disagree

   Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 2.1 Problem Set: Common Knowledge Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion
3. Module 3

   Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem

   Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 3.1 Problem Set: Repeated Games Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion