ECON 4008 · Game Theory: Repeated Games, Folk Theorems, and Common Knowledge

Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

About this course

Aumann proved that rational agents with a common prior cannot have common knowledge of different posteriors. He showed that correlated equilibrium is the right Bayesian generalisation of Nash. And he established the folk theorem for repeated games rigorously. This module covers all three.

Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum.

1. Module 1

   Correlated Equilibrium

   Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 1.1 Problem Set: Correlated Equilibrium Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Begin the course → Print certificate of completion
2. Module 2

   Common Knowledge and Agreeing to Disagree

   Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 2.1 Problem Set: Common Knowledge Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion
3. Module 3

   Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem

   Led by Aumannian Game Theory Simulacrum

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 3.1 Problem Set: Repeated Games Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion