INTERDEP 2001 · Wicked Problems — The Game Theory of Climate Negotiation

Led by John Nash Simulacrum

Climate negotiation as a strategic interaction between self-interested nations — the tragedy of the commons, free-rider problems, and the game-theoretic structure of international climate agreements.

1. Module 1

   Collective Action, Free Riders, and the Tragedy of the Commons

   Led by John Nash Simulacrum

   The question

   The tragedy of the commons formalised as a game · the prisoner's dilemma and its relationship to collective action · the free-rider problem in public goods provision · climate as a global public good (non-excludable, non-rivalrous) · why voluntary agreements are unstable · the Nash equilibrium of th

   Outcome

   Demonstrates competence in collective action, free riders, and the tragedy of the commons.

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 1.1 Collective Action, Free Riders, and the Tragedy of the Commons Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Begin the course → Print certificate of completion
2. Module 2

   International Agreements as Mechanism Design

   Led by John Nash Simulacrum

   The question

   The Paris Agreement analysed as a game-theoretic mechanism · why binding targets fail and voluntary pledges persist · the concept of mechanism design: can you design a game whose equilibrium is the outcome you want? · side payments, carbon markets, and transfer mechanisms · the role of monitoring an

   Outcome

   Demonstrates competence in international agreements as mechanism design.

   Sub-units

   1. ○ 2.2 International Agreements as Mechanism Design Open this unit → ✓ ↻
   Open this module → Print certificate of completion